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UDOT does not challenge the three principal arguments in Plaintiff Wintergreen's 
Opening Brief: (I) that Wintergreen's complaint properly alleges both state and federal 
constitutional inverse condemnation claims sufficient to overcome UDOT's motion to 
dismiss;1 (II) that Wintergreen's state constitutional inverse condemnation claims are not 
precluded by UDOT's statutory direct condemnation lawsuits;2 and (III) that Wintergreen's 
federal constitutional inverse condemnation claims are not precluded by UDOT's direct 
condemnation lawsuits initiated under state statute.3 
Instead, UDOT in its Appellee's Brief advances only two propositions: (1) That "[t]he 
trial court correctly dismissed this entire action as being in violation of Utah R. Civ. P. 
13(a)"4 and(2) That "[t]he trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs three § 1983 claims based 
on [UDOTJ's Eleventh Amendment immunity."5 
UDOT's first proposition is irrelevant, since although Plaintiff requested the trial court 
to allow Plaintiff to file its action as a counterclaim, the trial court instead based its dismissal 
of Plaintiff s action on Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), not on Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a). UDOT's second 
proposition also has no merit because the trial court based its dismissal of Plaintiff s federal 
\ Plaintiffs Opening Br. Pt. I, pp. 10-19. 
2
. Plaintiffs Opening Br. Pt. II, pp. 19-38. 
3
. Plaintiffs Opening Br. Pt. Ill, pp. 38-41. 
4
. UDOT Br. p. 1. 
5
. UDOT Br. p.2. 
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Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court, award costs to Plaintiff on appeal, 
and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings, 
I * NT 
UDOT erroneously asserts that M[t]he trial court correctly dismissed this entire action 
as being in violation of Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a)"6 UDOPs assertion is irrelevant, since although 
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"MR. MARTINEZ: Your honor, if I may seek some clarification. When Your 
Honor refers to consolidation, there are several different meanings. One is— 
THE COURT: And I understand your-
MR. MARTINEZ: -consolidate of all four cases? 
THE COURT: And I haven't made that decision. I don't know whether it means 
I consolidate three cases or whether I consolidate four cases. 
MR. MARTINEZ: Or there's a third alternative which is to consolidate the 
three cases and allow the plaintiff, the landowner, to assert the inverse condemnation 
in the counterclaim within those consolidated cases. 
THE COURT: Which is really accomplishing the same thing. It could be 
accomplishing the same thing as what would happen here if I simply consolidated it 
in. 
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes. I agree. 
THE COURT: ... I think your question Mr. Martinez, is a good one; that is, I 
haven't decided yet exactly what that consolidation might be. And I'm not certain my 
making a decision before I hear briefing on consolidation assists the Court in any 
particular way or assists the parties in any particular way, because I think you have at 
least those rights one way or the other . I either consolidate it in or you bring it as a 
counterclaim."7 
Accordingly, the trial court clearly understood that Plaintiff sought either 
"consolidation" of all four cases, or consolidation of the three direct condemnation lawsuits 
with Plaintiffs inverse condemnation claims asserted as counterclaims within those three 
consolidated actions. As both the trial judge and Plaintiffs counsel understood, the two 
alternatives would have accomplished the same thing, as a practical matter. 
The trial court then invited both sides to provide supplemental briefing on the 
consolidation/counterclaim question: 
THE COURT: [Addressing Mr. Hunter] How much time do you need to put 
together your thinking as to whether or not you would oppose consolidation by this 
Court and if so, you would brief it? 
7
. Transcript of Oral Argument on UDOT's Motion to Dismiss, November 29, 2005, 
p.40,11.20-25; p.42,11.1-25 (R.197) (emphasis added)(A copy of the Transcript is attached 
hereto as Plaintiffs Reply Addendum Exh. 1). 
3 
THE COURT: [Addressing both counsel] Okay. And then after you brief it, 
you're certainly entitled to reply. I'll give you the opportunity to make that reply. ...8 
In response to the trial court's invitation, on December 7, 2005, Plaintiff filed a 
Supplemental Memorandum in which Plaintiff in which Plaintiff asserted: 
I. Court May Consolidate all Four Cases or Convert Plaintiffs Fourth Suit into 
a COUNTERCLAIM in Consolidated Cases 
Through a letter to the Court dated December 2, 2005, UDOT states that it 
"will not oppose consolidation" of the three "direct" condemnation cases. In addition, 
UDOT in its Supplemental Memorandum states: 
"UDOT asks that the Article I, Section 22 claims either be dismissed as improper 
assertion of a counterclaim under Rule 13 or order that all Article I, Section 22 claims 
for just compensation be heard as part of the consolidated condemnation case(sV 
(emphasis added) 
Plaintiff properly has properly alleged both state and federal constitutional 
inverse condemnation claims. And since UDOT apparently does not object to having 
Plaintiffs state constitutional inverse condemnation claims consolidated with the 
three direct condemnation cases, this court should either consolidate all four cases or 
simply convert Plaintiffs fourth suit in its entirety into a Counterclaim with respect 
to each of the three consolidated cases.9 
In addition, and in further response to the trial court's invitation, on December 8,2005, 
Plaintiff filed a "Request for 4-Case Consolidation or, in the Alternative, Request for 3-Case 
Consolidation Plus Deeming 4th Case Complaint as Counterclaim."10 Accordingly, Plaintiff 
8
. Transcript of Oral Argument on UDOT's Motion to Dismiss, November 29, 2005, 
p.47,11.6-9, 19-21 (R.197)(Reply Addendum Exh.l). 
9
. Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum In Response to Court's Request and in 
Response to UDOT's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of UDOT's 12(b)(6) Motion 
to Dismiss, filed December 8,2005, p.2 (R. 158)(emphasis added)(A copy is attached hereto 
as Plaintiffs Reply Addendum Exh. 2). 
i0
. Plaintiffs Request for 4-Case Consolidation or, in the Alternative, Request for 3-
Case Consolidation Plus Deeming 4th Case Complaint as Counterclaim, filed December 9, 
2005 (R. 160-63)(emphasis added)(A copy is attached hereto as Plaintiffs Reply Addendum 
Exh. 3). 
4 
properly requested to assert a counterclaim. 
Moreover, UDOT in its Supplemental Memorandum dated December 2, 2005 
expressly consented to adjudication of Plaintiff s state constitutional inverse condemnation 
claims as counterclaims in the three consolidated direct condemnation lawsuits: 
UDOT asks that the Article I, Section 22 claims either be dismissed as improper 
assertion of a counterclaim under Rule 13 or order that all Article L Section 22 claims 
for just compensation be heard as part of the consolidated condemnation casefs).11 
B. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs claims under 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim 
UDOT states that "The court rejected plaintiffs claim that inverse condemnation 
claims were not based on the same transaction or occurrence as were the condemnation 
actions. R. 172-74"12 One searches in vain through those pages—or in fact throughout the 
entire trial court's memorandum decision-for anything resembling support for that assertion. 
On the contrary, at the oral argument on UDOT's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs fourth, 
inverse condemnation lawsuit, UDOT admitted that only UDOT's 12(b)(6) motion was 
before the court: 
THE COURT: Right. But at this point your motion is a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6). 
MR. HUNTER: Yes.13 
n
. UDOT Supplemental Memorandum dated December 2, 2005 (R. 164-168, at 
165)(emphasis added). 
12
. UDOT Br. p.4. 
13
. Transcript of Oral Argument on UDOT's Motion to Dismiss, November 29,2005, 
p.43,11.9-11 (R.197) (emphasis added)(Reply Addendum Exh. 1). 
5 
Moreover, on page 6 of its Memorandum Decision, the trial court stated: 
"The Court GRANTS UDOT's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss... .Ml4 
Thus, the trial court ruled that Plaintiffs allegations were legally insufficient to state a claim, 
not, as UDOT contends, because Plaintiff was prohibited from asserting those claims in its 
fourth, inverse condemnation complaint by the compulsory counterclaim rule. 
C. Plaintiffs request to assert a counterclaim became moot 
Since the trial court ultimately granted UDOT's motion to dismiss the claims in 
Plaintiffs fourth, inverse condemnation lawsuit, Plaintiffs request for 
consolidation/counterclaim of Plaintiffs claims in that fourth lawsuit into the three direct 
condemnation suits became moot. Thus, the trial court's memorandum decision concluded: 
The Court The Court GRANTS UDOT's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and orders 
the three condemnation suits ... against Wintergreen be consolidated.15 
Since the trial court thus dismissed all the claims in Plaintiffs fourth, inverse 
condemnation lawsuit and consolidated only the three pending direct condemnation lawsuits 
brought by UDOT, the trial court did not bother to further address Plaintiffs request to assert 
its claims as counterclaims in the consolidated proceedings. 
UDOT's arguments regarding the compulsory counterclaim rule thus are irrelevant. 
l\ Tr. Ct. Mem. Opinion and Order, March 6, 2006. p.6 (R.170). 
15
. Tr. Ct. Mem. Opinion and Order, March 6, 2006, p.6 (R.170)(emphasis added). 
6 
D. This Court should direct the trial court to consolidate all four cases or to allow 
Plaintiffs fourth, inverse condemnation, lawsuit claims as counterclaims in the three 
direct condemnation suits 
If this Court agrees that Plaintiff properly stated claims in its fourth, inverse 
condemnation lawsuit, then this Court should direct the trial court to consolidate all four 
cases or to allow Plaintiffs fourth, inverse condemnation lawsuit claims as counterclaims in 
the three now-consolidated direct condemnation suits. In that regard, Plaintiffs arguments 
in its request for consolidation/counterclaim in the court below are apropos: 
"I. Consolidation of All Four Lawsuits Will Achieve Consistent Jury 
Determinations 
The question then becomes one of efficient, consistent and fair administration 
of the four lawsuits. A jury must determine both the direct condemnation and inverse 
condemnation claims. Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 327 
(1898)(ff ...the means of arriving at the estimate are within the knowledge of men and 
can be adduced before a jury.")(Lorin Fair). 
Thus, since Plaintiff properly alleges state and federal constitutional claims, 
all four cases should be consolidated so that a single jury will achieve consistent, fair 
determinations of the four lawsuits. UTAHR.CIV.P. 42(a). 
II. Consolidation of Three Direct Condemnation Lawsuits, Plus Deeming of 4th 
Case Complaint as Counterclaim Also Will Achieve Consistent Jury 
Determinations 
Alternatively, the Court may achieve the necessary consistency, efficiency and 
fairness by consolidating the three direct condemnation lawsuits, and deeming all 
claims in the fourth, inverse condemnation lawsuit as a Counterclaim, applicable to 
all three cases in the consolidated action."16 
16
. Plaintiffs Request for 4-Case Consolidation or, in the Alternative, Request for 3-
Case Consolidation Plus Deeming 4th Case Complaint as Counterclaim, filed December 9, 
2005 (R.161-62)(A copy is attached hereto as Plaintiffs Reply Addendum Exh. 3). 
7 
II. PLAINTIFF PROPERLY ALLEGES FEDERAL CLAIMS 
UDOT erroneously asserts that "[t]he trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs three 
§ 1983 claims based on [UDOTJ's Eleventh Amendment immunity."17 On the contrary, the 
trial court based its dismissal of Plaintiff s federal claims on a decision of the Georgia Court 
of Appeals that an inverse condemnation claim based on Section 1983 could not be asserted 
when the government has brought a direct condemnation action. Since the Plaintiffs federal 
claims are based directly on the federal constitution, and alternatively on the doctrine of Ex 
Parte Young. 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Georgia Court of Appeals decision is not only lacking 
in precedential authority for Utah courts, but also is inapplicable to this case. 
A. Plaintiffs claims in its fourth, inverse condemnation, lawsuit are not based on 
Section 1983 
Relying on a decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals, the trial court dismissed 
Plaintiffs federal claims on the ground that an inverse condemnation claim basedon Section 
1983 could not be asserted when the government has brought a direct condemnation action.18 
It is elementary that Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a 
method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States 
Constitution and federal statutes that it describes." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Citv of Monterey v. 
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey. Ltd.. 526 U.S. 687, 749 n.9, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 1658 n.9 
17
. UDOT Br. p.2. 
18
. Tr. Ct. Mem. Opinion and Order, March 6, 2006, pp.6-7, R. 171-72. ("The [Court 
of Appeals of Georgia] found a taking which is no more than an ordinary legal action by the 
department of Transportation to take property in accordance with the statutes of the state is 
not enough to convert the action into a civil rights violation [under Section 1983]...."). 
8 
(1999)fquoting Baker v. McCollan. 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). Thus, Section 1983 is 
merely a "shopping basket" for claims; the substantive content of the claims put into the 
"shopping basket" must come from the "shelves" of the federal constitution or statutes. 
The substantive basis for Plaintiffs federal claims, therefore, is not Section 1983, 
which merely provides the remedies for Plaintiffs federal claims. Instead, as set out in 
Plaintiffs Opening Brief,19 the substantive content of Plaintiffs claims arises from two 
independent sources: First, Plaintiff has a substantive right against UDOT arising directly 
from the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution. 
Jacobs v United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933) (plaintiff who claims property has been taken can 
sue directly under the Fifth Amendment). UDOT does not contest Plaintiffs arguments in 
that regard. 
Second, Plaintiff also has a substantive right to injunctive relief against UDOT 
officials under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). UDOT also does not 
contest Plaintiffs arguments in that regard. 
B. San Remo Hotel says nothing about direct condemnations and their relation to 
inverse condemnation claims 
UDOT misconstrues the United States Supreme Court's decision in San Remo Hotel, 
L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005) by 
contending that case established "that a federal claim could be raised in the same action 
brought by the state to condemn private property.ff20 
19
. PlaintiffsOpeningBr.Pt. I.B.2.a, pp. 15-17. 
20
. U D O T Br. p . 12. 
9 
First, no direct condemnation was involved at all in San Remo Hotel. The Hotel 
applied for conversion and conditional use permits to allow tourist use of the hotel. The San 
Francisco Planning Commission granted both permits, but subject to payment of a $567,000 
"in lieu" fee, and the provision of lifetime leases to the then current-residents. 
Second, the Supreme Court in San Remo Hotel held that a claimant may assert both 
state and federal takings claims simultaneously in the same lawsuit in a state court.21 The 
Court thereby overruled prior state court rulings, including that of the Utah Supreme Court 
in Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7,67 P.3d 466, that a federal takings claim was 
not "ripe" until a state takings claim had been fully adjudicated. As the San Remo Hotel case 
recognized, when combined with issue preclusion rules, that would prevent a litigant from 
adjudicating a federal takings claim in any forum at all. It is in that context that the United 
States Supreme Court stated: 
" [State courts may hear] simultaneously a plaintiffs request for compensation under 
state law and the claim that, in the alternative, the denial of compensation would 
violate the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution."22 
Accordingly, San Remo Hotel held only that a takings claimant may bring all state and 
federal takings claims in a state court. That is a different question altogether from whether 
the state's initiation of direct condemnation proceedings limits takings claimants to the 
remedy provided in the direct condemnation proceedings, thereby prohibiting the assertion 
of inverse condemnation claims, state or federal. UDOT simply misreads San Remo Hotel. 
. Id at 2506. 
22
. Id. 
C. UDOT is attempting a shell game 
UDOT's concluding statement in its Appellee's Brief that San Remo Hotel authorizes 
"The trial court [to] hear plaintiff s federal takings claims simultaneously to [sic] determining 
the condemnation claims"23 is a misleading attempt at a shell game. UDOT means that 
Plaintiff is limited to the direct condemnation lawsuits and that Plaintiffs federal and state 
inverse condemnation claims are folded into those lawsuits. UDOT thereby attempts a shell 
game, whereby Plaintiffs federal and state inverse condemnation claims vanish under the 
direct condemnation lawsuit shells. 
As discussed at length in Plaintiffs Opening Brief, the direct condemnation lawsuits 
do not address the full scope of the harms suffered by Plaintiff as a result of UDOT's 
conduct. Since Plaintiff has properly alleged federal takings claims, the only question is 
whether they should be adjudicated in a separate, fourth inverse condemnation lawsuit or 
instead as consolidated actions/counterclaims with the three direct condemnation lawsuits. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment dismissing Plaintiff Wintergreen's fourth, inverse 
condemnation complaint, should be reversed. Since Wintergreen's appeal thereby will have 
resulted in substantial benefit to the public as a result of the refinement in state inverse 
condemnation law brought about by this appeal, Wintergreen should be awarded its costs on 
appeal. UTAH RULES APP. PROC. 34(b)(costs on appeal against the state of Utah); Cooke v. 
Cooke, 2001 UT App 110, [^14, 22 P.3d 1249 (successful appellant entitled to costs on 
2\ UDOT Br. p. 12. 
11 
appeal). 
DATED this 28th day of September, 2006. 
JOTNMAI 
attorney for Plaintiff-Appfflant Wintergreen 
12 
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District Court Judge 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 2005, 11:00 A.M. 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Let's go on the record. This is 
4 the matter of Uintergreen Group, L.c, versus Utah 
5 Department of Transportation. It Is Case Number 
6 050300341. 
7 Counsel, if you uant to make your record of 
B appearance here today. 
9 MR COLESSIDES: Nick Colessides together 
10 with John Martinez for the plaintiff, Your Honor. 
11 MR. MARTINEZ: And for the record, Your 
12 Honor, the dean asked me always to note that I do not 
13 represent the University or the College of Law. 
14 THE COURT: Does he require that disclaimer 
15 of all professors or just yourself? 
16 MR. MARTINEZ: All professors. 
17 THE COURT: Thank you. 
18 MR. HUNTER: Randy Hunter of the Attorney 
19 General's office. We do represent the University but 
20 not in this matter today. 
21 THE COURT: All right. 
22 MR. CUSHING: Andrew Cushing also with the 
23 State Department of Transportation, who has represented 
24 the University in trie past but not today. 
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RANDY S. HUNTER 
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1 bedfellows the law makes. All right, Counsel, it's your 
2 notion. 
3 MR. HUNTER: It is. 
4 THE COURT: If you would like to proceed. 
5 MR. HUNTER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
6 Before we get started, I understand Mr. 
7 Colessides has requested a recording of this and so I 
8 also would like a recording. Thank you. 
9 THE CLERK: I have three tapes. I can keep 
10 one for you. If that's okay with you. 
11 MR. HUNTER: Than you. I apologize I wasn't 
12 able to do that before. 
13 THE COURT: Let's try to make this videotape 
14 as interesting as possible. 
15 MR. HUNTER: I believe this will be an 
16 interesting case for Your Honor. I'm looking forward to 
17 the arguments today. I'm looking forward to hearing 
18 what the arguments are, to be honest. 
19 What has brought us to the Court today is 
20 that the Utah Department of Transportation has been 
21 reconstructing SR-36. which is the road that goes from 
22 Tooele to 1-80 out at Lakepoint. And as part of that 
23 reconstruction a condemnation was filed against the 
24 plaintiffs in this case, in the condemnation case 
25 they're defendants. And there actually are three 
Page 5 
1 condennation cases; one here on this parcel, one on this 
2 parcel up here, and one on this parcel. 
3 THE COURT: Just to orient ne, as I*n looking 
4 at this, tell ne where in connection with the parcel is 
5 the Medical Center, the hospital. 
6 MR. HUNTER: Right here. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. So the hospital is on the 
8 west side, the top of your chart then is the east side 
9 Of SR-36? 
10 MR. HUNTER: Correct. This is the overpass 
11 that cones down fron the railroad and here is an aerial 
12 photo that I have narked on. This is the hospital. 
13 There are sone buildings here at the botton of the 
14 overpass, here is the railroad tracks. The overpass 
15 cones down and ends about here And if you ever see 
18 these cases in your courtroon we'll have fancier 
17 exhibits, I pronise. I threw these together quickly for 
18 you to have a feel for it 
19 Now, this is a fourth case. Those are three 
20 cases that are pending before Your Honor This is a 
21 fourth case that has been filed by the parties, the 
22 Wintergreen Investnent Group or Wintergreen Partnership, 
23 and this is a case in inverse condennation. The State 
24 action which is alleged to bring about the inverse 
25 condennation is the filing of a condennation action. I 
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1 attorney's fees. Attorney's fees are awarded under the 
2 law for an Inverse condennation case and are not awarded 
3 for a condennation case. And so we're seeing a plethora 
4 of answers to condennation cases and the answer arouses 
5 the counterclain of condennation. They're 
6 inappropriate. 
7 THE COURT: Let ne understand this, because 
8 as I understood at least sone of your argunent fron the 
9 pleadings you believe this to be a conpulsory 
10 counterclam that should have been filed with respect to 
11 the— this sort of action could have been filed as a 
12 counterclam. Now, an I hearing you say sonething 
13 different today; that it's not available by way of 
14 counterclam' 
15 MR. HUNTER: No. it is— the Clam for just 
16 conpensation is available by counterclain and they've 
17 raised it properly. 
18 THE COURT: And is it raised properly in these 
19 three cases' 
20 MR. HUNTER: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: So you have counterelains pending 
22 in those cases? 
23 MR. HUNTER: We have counterclains for 
24 seeking just conpensation. I do not believe they're 
25 couched as a cause of action in inverse condennation, 
Page 6 
1 nust confess this is new to ne, I have not seen that 
2 alleged in the past as a State action causing a taking, 
3 as the filing of a taking. 
4 Mr. Martinez and I are having sone fun here 
5 in a series of cases and I think this is just part of 
B the series where we're exploring the paraneters of the 
7 takings clause and having a lot of fun in doing so. I 
B think And I an here today to represent the takings 
9 clause, the Constitution. There are sone laws that 
10 define under which governnent can take and how just 
11 conpensation is to be paid The takings clause in Utah 
12 is Article 1, Section 22: "Private property shall not 
13 be taken or danaged for public use without just 
14 conpensation." And I've included a copy of that in the 
15 bench book that I have provided Your Honor 
16 Now, I have filed in response to this 
17 conplaint a notion to disniss under Rule 12(b) and the 
IB basis for ny notion is that they have failed to state a 
19 cause of action No cause of action exists for a taking 
20 because we are doing the taking. Ue are seeking in 
21 those condennation cases an award of Just conpensation 
22 They will be properly conpensated under the law I don't 
23 know exactly, and I'n looking forward to hearing exactly 
24 what type of conpensation beyond just conpensation they 
25 believe they are entitled to. Ue do know one is 
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1 are they? 
2 THE COURT: That's correct. 
3 MR HUNTER: And the only thing to be gained 
4 by an inverse condennation, as I say, is attorneys 
5 fees. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. I'n with you 
7 MR HUNTER: And that's the part that I nean 
8 is inappropriate. 
9 THE COURT: All right. 
10 MR. HUNTER: Ue are seeking just 
11 conpensation. Plain and sinple And so ny Rule 13 
12 argunent is very sinple, that this is a natter which 
13 will be addressed in those condennation cases and to 
14 have to argue it in a fourth case is— it's just plain 
15 inappropriate under the rules It's a single 
16 transaction. Now, in this case they are filed each as 
17 separate actions. If they beheve that they are not 
18 separate actions, their renedy is to file a notion for 
19 consolidation and we would address that at that tine. Ue 
20 do not believe it's appropriate for consolidation and 
21 we're not conceding that because they're separate 
22 parcels, separate tax identifications, and they are not 
23 contiguous, and don't have any continuity or unlfornity 
24 of use. 



























question then You seen to be, based upon what I just 
heard you say. that the renedy that nay be available 
that you allege by way of counterclaim is not 
necessarily available to then because their argument is 
that this is part and parcel of a grander Piece of 
property, and that grander piece of property needs to be 
factored in when looking at Just compensation. And If 
you were to say because they are not contiguous and, 
therefore, are separate parcels, so that you resist a 
motion to consolidate, then the plaintiffs would appear 
to be in this particular case left without a remedy and 
you ultimately by this argument seen to be making some 
portion of their case. 
MR HUNTER: I hope I'm not, Your Honor. I an 
saying the proper remedy for that is a motion to 
consolidate, not this independent action. And we uould 
address that. If they're entitled to, and if they can 
prove this grander scheme, then a consolidation would be 
appropriate. I'n asserting they cannot prove that and 
reserving the right to challenge that. But there have 
been other cases where we've consolidated then and if 
it's appropriate then I have no heartburn with these 
being consolidated, should Your Honor believe that's 
appropriate. we'll deal with that at that tine. 
The other step— Let ne skip over the 
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1 as this, causes injury to that greater parcel. The 
2 question of severance damages will be fully litigated in 
3 those condemnation cases and if they're entitled to 
4 severance damages, they will receive an award of that. 
5 Now, Article 1, Section 22 of the Utah 
6 Constitutional Takings Clause is self-enforcing and a 
7 cause of action can be brought under that article. But 
8 then how do you calculate the damages? The Utah 
9 Governmental Immunity Act has addressed that and it 
10 tells us how to calculate the damages for a cause of 
11 action under Article 1, Section 22, and you calculate 
12 those damages exactly the same way that you calculate 
13 damages in a condemnation case. It refers you to Title 
14 34 or to Chapter 34 of Title 78, the inverse donam or 
15 the imminent domain chapter. So the remedies available 
16 to a landowner under an Article 1, Section 22 action are 
17 identical to the letter of the remedies available under 
18 a straightforward condemnation. They're not entitled to 
19 some other remedies ethereal floating out there in the 
20 universe somewhere. They are defined by law and I am 
21 here today to defend that law and see that they receive 
22 the just compensation that they are entitled to under 
23 law. 
24 so ultn ttiat I uould liKe to end uitti tfiose 
25 three argunents and I'n as curious as you are to hear 
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1 severance damages and speak to Tightness. Normally, 
2 when we talk about Tightness in the context of a 
3 constitutional taking, we're talking about an 
4 adninistrative process, and they haven't exhausted their 
5 adninistrative renedies That's not the Tightness 
6 argument that we're arguing The Tightness argument 
7 that we're arguing is that a final determination of just 
8 compensation in those cases has not yet been nade Ue 
9 are seeking Just compensation, they are seeking just 
10 compensation If those courts, if those Juries in those 
11 cases award just compensation, then they will be 
12 compensated under the Constitution and so why is this 
13 other fourth case seeking just compensation as well? I 
14 am curious and I'n anxious to hear what that is, what 
15 type of just conpensation they're entitled to that just 
16 compensation under the takings won't be awarded them. 
17 And so this case is not ripe because those juries have 
18 not yet made their award of Just compensation In 
19 theory their award of just compensation adequately 
20 compensates Uintergreen, the property owner, under the 
21 Constitution. 
22 That moves us to our third preliminary 
23 argument, severance damages. The whole purpose of 
24 severance damages is to compensate a landowner for 
25 danages to the greater parcel when a strip taking, such 
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1 what type of compensation they believe they're entitled 
2 to beyond what the law gives then and I would like to 
3 reserve the right to address those once I figure out 
4 what they nay be. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MR. MARTINEZ: First of all, Your Honor, if 
7 I nay, I would like to describe the three cases that are 
8 already in play. We'll refer to those as the direct 
9 condemnation actions that UDOT has initiated. 
10 Essentially we have the first one of 459, it's that 
11 little strip right there, with respect to 2400 North 
12 The second one is 524, the strip across 2200 North, and 
13 then along SR-36, affecting the plaintiffs land on the 
14 east side of SR-36. And then the third lawsuit is 525, 
15 taking a couple of different strips along the west side 
16 of SR-36. 
17 it is surprising to ne that counsel for the 
18 state does not— states that he does not quite 
19 understand the role of this fourth inverse condennation 
20 lawsuit, because it all is premised on the fact that 
21 these three lawsuits that they have brought, the direct 
22 condemnation lawsuits, have the effect of fragmenting 
23 the plaintiffs lands. The plaintiffs lands are 
24 crossnatctied in nere. mere's trie Medical Center, and 
25 they are on the west side as well as on the east side of 
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1 SR-36 
2 Counsel for the State, would have this court 
3 believe that the three direct condemnation lawsuits will 
4 adequately compensate the landowner for the harm that 
5 has been imposed The fourth lawsuit, the inverse 
6 condemnation lausuit, simply begs to differ with that 
7 conclusion Essentially what's happened, Your Honor, is 
8 by condemning, by filing three different lawsuits 
9 involving only small pieces, those three pieces, what 
10 the state has done is said: "Look, you're entitled to j 
11 the value of the land we took, which is not a major I 
12 amount of land, and you are also entitled to severance I 
13 damages but the severance damages will only be that 
14 which is affected by each of those different lawsuits 1 
15 So, for example, if you take the first one, it's only I 
16 that little tiny strip By definition what's happened | 
17 is the filing of that lawsuit fragments the plaintiff's 
18 entire landholding into Just that little area plus, if 1 
19 anything, Just this tiny corner here The larger of our 
20 greater parcel is actually fairly minimal. Consequently, I  
21 the same thing happens in each of the other lawsuits. | 
22 The state's appraisal, not surprisingly, says, You are | 
23 entitled to the value of the land that we've taken, 1 
24 those minimal amounts of land, but you are entitled to I 
25 no severance damages whatsoever. And it's that concern, j 
1 
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1 acres," in other words, the condemnations will reduce 
2 the total size from 121 to 116. 
3 Three They have blocked the access 
4 completely from SR-36 over this way on 2000 North 
5 Before the State's actions, which included more than 
6 simply bringing the direct condemnation claim lawsuits, 
7 they have blocked off this intersection right here. You 
8 can no longer go right to the plaintiffs land here, 
9 thereby isolating it from the rest of the parcels and 
10 from SR-36 itself. 
11 Number 4, rendering 2200 Korth. which is 
12 right here, they transformed that into a 
13 right-in/right-out so that, again, has the effect of 
14 isolating this parcel from the rest of the landholdings, 
15 unreasonably restricting it, the access essentially to 
16 that land there. In order to get to that land you have 
17 to go now up around and through, and over and down to 
IB get to this area here. To get out to go on SR-36 going 
19 south, you have to go all the way up — let's see. 
20 Let's see You can get out here to the right but you 
21 cannot go left In order to go south you have to go 
22 over on 4th. that is at 4th East, go up here, turn left 
23 here, and then turn down That's the only way in which 
24 you can get to SR-36 going south fron this parcel now, 
25 Before that you could simply do it by going out this way 
r « 
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1 as well as the fact that it's fragmenting the I 
2 plaintiffs land is the reason why plaintiff brought II 
I 3 this fourth inverse condemnation lawsuit Essentially II 
I 4 what plaintiff is saying in the inverse condemnation || 
5 lawsuit is: Look, you have done several things that I 
I IJ 
j 6 have affected or impacted our landholdings, and these || 
7 are the landholdings involved Plaintiff had. prior to | 
8 the States's conduct, had planned the Northtown Shopping II 
I 9 Center, which would have involved this entire area as an I 
10 integrated economic unit And we have documented in our II 
I 1 1 pleadings the idea that the integrated economic unit is 11 
I 12 what the relevant property is I 
I 13 Moreover, the State contends that all it has I 
1 14 done is filed direct condemnation actions but that I 
I 15 simply is not the case. If Your Honor will look to our II 
J 1 6 memorandum in opposition to the plaintiffs notion to II 
1 7 dismiss— the defendant's notion to dismiss at Page 4, II 
IB at the bottom, that's our— plaintiffs memorandum in | 
19 opposition which would be item 4 in our courtesy copies. II 
20 Item 4, Page 4. At the bottom it says: 'The net effect | 
21 on all plaintiffs land has been as follows- I 
22 Fragmentation into one 14 483 acre parcel in the east II 
23 side. ' that would be leaving that parcel isolated from II 
24 the rest of them. II 
25 'Secondly, reduction in total size to 116 51 I 
I Page 16 || 
1 1 out. Now, you have to go all the way up and around and II 
I 2 through and over and down. They have also precluded— 1 
1 3 You will notice that this is an orange dotted line || 
4 This is from the county's master plan and what that is i 
5 schedulsd to be is a street that connects SR-36 with the 1 
6 Overland subdivision on this side In the course of | 
I 7 their construction in this area, what they've done is I 
I 8 blocked this off. They have not opened it up so that I 
I 9 there 13 no west direction travel through that area of II 
I 10 the plaintiffs landholdings Essentially, they've || 
I 11 isolated the land from each other, as I've demonstrated || 
J 12 through their condemnation, as well as the blocking of I 
I 13 access and the intersections. And the net result has || 
I 14 been a substantial diminution in the entire landholdings II 
I 1 5 and that fundamentally is what that fourth lawsuit is || 
I 16 about. The relevant property is different from the I 
j 17 property that was identified in each of the three direct II 
IB condemnation lawsuits. And, Your Honor, that is the I 
19 purpose of the Just compensation clause The purpose of || 
20 the just compensation clause, as is often said by both || 
21 the State court and the Federal courts, is to prevent | 
22 one individual from having to bear burdens that in all 
23 fairness and justice should be borne by the public as a I 
24 whole. The inverse condemnation action seeks to do that 




















































clains and Federal clams. Nowhere in the States's 
argument today, nor in the papers that they have 
submitted, do they contend that plaintiff has not net 
the elements of stating clams. The standard under 
12(b)6 is whether plaintiffs allegations are 
sufficient. And Plaintiffs have alleged the necessary 
elements There is property, the larger area, there has 
been a taking and damaging both in terms of the direct 
condemnation lawsuits that have fragmented the area and 
in terns of the other six actions that the State has 
done physically to interfere with the way in which the 
entire economic— the integrated economic unit was to be 
developed, and there have been damages which need to be 
ascertained by a trier of fact. 
The State has more or less conceded, and I 
was as surprised as Your Honor when the State said they 
have no heartburn with respect to consolidation Well, 
if they mean that their major concern is that there will 
be three different trials, or three different juries, 
well, we can simply consolidate the fourth action into 
all of them. Let's let the Jury decide to what extent 
has the plaintiff been affected by the State's conduct 
taken as a whole. 
THE COURT: Let me stop and ask you this, 
because it's referred to, at least in the pleadings by 
Page 
recent decision from the Utah Court of Appeals as of May 
12th that I had prepared for the argument as we have 
been going along, that specifically addresses that 
point. It addresses that— I'll provide a copy to 
counsel, and if I nay approach the bench. 
THE COURT: Do I already have a copy of this? 
MR. MARTINEZ: No. No, Your Honor, 
(inaudible) before. I think this is a fairly critical 
component and I have highlighted the necessary message 
In that case in Hughes Land, the Court dealt with the 
question of the extent to which the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, a statutory provision, and it's notice of 
claim requirements apply to inverse condemnation actions 
under the State Constitution. The Court in discussing 
it refers to it as a natter of fairly well understood— 
a fairly well understood proposition so much so that we 
hardly ever mention it, "It is clear," at the bottom of 
page 3, "that legislative power itself nust be exercised 
within the framework of the Constitution." And going 
over to page 4 in that sane paragraph, "Accordingly, it 
has been so long established and universally recognized 
as to be hardly necessary to state that a statutory 
enactment contravened any provision of the Constitution; 
the latter governs." And the Court of Appeals in that 
case was discussing the Colenan decision, which is cited 
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1 the State, and it would seen to be an appropriate 
2 renedy. and that is: You do have a remedy under Section 
3 78-10(4) I think, for this, as the State talks about it. 
4 to severance damages. And that talks about this greater 
5 parcel being part of what would otheruise be a 
6 contenplation of damages for purposes of a condemnation 
7 lawsuit. And so as I walk through the thinking of this, 
8 the idea of the consolidation, of course, as addressed 
9 by one or both of you is in the context of three 
10 separate lawsuits and three separate parcels, however, 
11 all involving one integrated economic parcel that you 
12 have just been talking about. How is it that the remedy 
13 isn't available to you simply by consolidation of these 
14 three cases and the proper counterclaim associated with 
15 the damages of severance that has arisen as a result of 
16 the fact or impact upon this greater parcel? 
17 MR. MARTINEZ: Well, two responses to that. 
IB Your Honor; one law and the other factual. The first 
19 is, the State seems to refer to the statutory provisions 
20 as if they are by way of incantation. The statutory 
21 provisions, we learn in the first year of law school 
22 statutes cannot prevail over constitutional provisions 
23 The constitutional claim is separate and distinct from 
24 the statutory claim. And anticipating that this was an 
25 argument that the State would nake, there is a most 
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1 In our pleadings and also included in the courtesy 
2 copies, where the Court emphasizes: Look, there is the 
3 statutes. There are the statutes and then there's the 
4 constitutional provision. 'And the inverse condemnation 
5 claim which cones out of the constitutional provision is 
6 separately developed by the courts." So the first 
7 question then becomes under the Constitution— 
8 THE COURT: Let me stop and ask you this 
9 question But it nay be separately developed but this 
10 doesn't suggest that it be the statutory remedy that 
11 we're looking at here under Section 4 of 78-10 is 
12 unconstitutional. Indeed— 
13 MR. MARTINEZ: No, it does not, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Indeed, it is constitutional, has 
15 probably been proven to be constitutional, so that's 
16 your renedy. 
17 MR. MARTINEZ: But the question then 
18 becomes— 
19 THE COURT: Under the Constitution and the 
20 statute. 
21 MR. MARTINEZ: —how is the property defined 
22 for purposes of the constitutional claim9 And that is 
23 the factual question The difficulty with the statutory 
24 renedy, and it should cone as no surprise that both the 
25 State Legislature and the Utah Department of 
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1 Transportation have fornulated standards and guidelines 
2 for determning severance damages that are fairly 
3 pro-government That is the reason why the inverse 
4 condemnation remedy is so critical, is so serious that 
5 we maintain some substantive content to it, because that 
6 is the only way in which the Plaintiff can broaden the 
7 focus, if you will, to include the impact on the entire 
B landholdings; whereas, the State would have the Court 
9 instead focus more narrowly on the impact of each of the 
10 separate and distinct and independent direct 
11 condemnations, the very small parcels in each situation, 
12 that would relate only to a snail area in each case. 
13 The purpose of the fourth lawsuit therefore 
14 dramatically differs from the three lawsuits and, as I 
15 mentioned before, we have no difficulty if the State is 
16 primarily concerned with the possibility of duplication 
17 of effort, or confusion, or inconsistent results, or 
18 perhaps even efficiency of adjudication, we have no 
19 difficulty with folding in the fourth lawsuit with the 
20 other three. 
21 THE COURT: Would you then simply say this: 
22 That the inverse condemnation suit that you brought is 
23 another, you believe, remedy available under this 
24 statute for purposes of how a jury may look at and 
25 determine the outcome of the particular case' 
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1 process is the same by way of evidence, so what is 
2 gained by this inverse condemnation lawsuit other than 
3 attorneys fees, the right to claim attorneys fees? 
4 MR. MARTINEZ: Because the State in each 
5 case will argue that the relevant or larger parcel is 
6 much more constrained or restricted in each of the cases 
7 involved. That's— well, in my cynical self says that's 
8 why they brought three lawsuits instead of one, which is 
9 to fragment or segregate out each direct condemnation 
10 from the rest of the holdings. The fourth 
11 condemnation— the fourth inverse condemnation lawsuit 
12 opens UP the inquiry under the constitutional authority 
13 to do so, so that the jury can consider the— not only 
14 the direct condemnations but also the physical conduct 
15 that the state has engaged in that affects the entire 
is landholdings. 
17 THE COURT: That physical being the 
18 elimination of the egress and ingress? 
19 MR. MARTINEZ: Exactly. Blocking it off and 
20 making this only a right-in/right-out o n — 
21 THE COURT: But doesn't that, wouldn't that 
22 come out as evidence under Section 2, 78, instead of 10, 
23 78-34-10? 
24 MR. MARTINEZ: mat would not, Your Honor, 
25 because the State has argued in previous cases, which we 
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1 MR. MARTINEZ: Well, it's an additional 
2 remedy, it's a constitutional remedy. The determination 
3 would be indistinguishable. For a jury making the 
4 determination you can tell them: Okay. You're making 
5 this under the statute, you're making this under the 
6 Constitution, and also the Constitution, it won't make 
7 any difference one would imagine. And. therefore, 
8 that's why as a practical matter we have no objection to 
9 consolidating the four lawsuits into one and making it 
10 much more efficient 
11 THE COURT: Let's just follow that up, because 
12 what you said earlier was that there are procedures in 
13 Place or the defining of the property that the State has 
14 provided that makes it more difficult and more narrow 
15 for somebody in your particular context to be successful 
16 with this argument about a larger parcel. Indeed, I 
17 look at it, and I've been wrong, I've been citing 
18 Section 4, but it's Section 10. It simply says, "The 
19 Jury must hear legal evidence as offered by the parties 
20 to ascertain and assess, and; 2. Whether the property 
21 sought to be condemned constitutes a larger part of the 
22 parcel, the damages which would accrue to that portion 
23 as well." 
24 MR. MARTINEZ: That's right. 
25 THE COURT: So the remedy is the same, the 
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1 have not— which have not become relevant here, has 
2 argued in previous cases that the Interference with 
3 access, whether It be physical, or by way of the direct 
4 condemnation, is simply not compensable, in fact, they 
5 reiterated that in the appraisals that they did here 
6 Any other impact that the condemnations have is simply 
7 non-conpensable. 
8 THE COURT: That's a factual question that 
9 the Jury will be asked to decide, whether it is or 
10 isn't, and they'll provide that evidence to suggest it's 
11 not and trot out the experts and you'll trot out the 
12 experts as well to suggest it is, and that becomes a 
13 factual determination for the Jury: is that correct? 
14 MR. MARTINEZ: That'S correct. And the 
15 question then becomes: With respect to what? Because 
16 one must determine not only what the governmental 
17 conduct is but also what the burden Is on the landowner; 
18 what it is that's being burdened? The State will seek 
19 and, in fact, has in the appraisal, will seek to focus 
20 it very, very narrowly and potentially at least and. 
21 certainly, if they're consistent, will seek to exclude 
22 any evidence with respect to the entire mall; whereas. 
23 In fact, under the inverse condemnation claim that Is 
24 entirely relevant and can be introduced. 
25 THE COURT: And this is what I'm struggling 
J — — — — — — = — = — — — — I 
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1 with because I — as I look at this and I look at the I 
2 fact that I have three separate lawsuits, which I'n not I 
I 3 going to pernit to go forward, I'n going to consolidate II 
4 these II 
5 MR MARTINEZ: Uh-hUh. | 
6 THE COURT: And pern it you to nake your II 
J 7 argunent in the context of a consolidated case that II 
I 8 deals with this impact as it impacts this larger parcel I 
9 with each of these three separate mpacts there And I I 
J 10 nay hear protestations fron the State but I can tell II 
1 1 then that short of there being sone legal precedent I 
1 12 otherwise, I don't see a reason why I wouldn't I 
I 13 consolidate then. So assuning that I consolidate these I 
14 cases, then your argunent is-- has the abiLity to be || 
I 15 addressed within the statutory framework as set forth I 
I 16 under Section 34 I 
17 MR MARTINEZ: As long as the— well, the 
I 18 problen is that the direct condennation cases thenselves I 
1 19 will still be distinct components within that 
20 consolidated proceeding and so I have no doubt that the 
I 21 State would still nonetheless argue that we should only I 
22 consider the snail areas next to the direct condennation II 
J 23 parcels, as opposed to the larger econonic, integrated 
I 24 econonic unit. And that is why it is so essential to I 
I 25 include the inverse condennation clam as well. II 
I I 
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1 MR. MARTINEZ: Uh-hUh. 
2 THE COURT: I do have the power under ny— 
3 the Rules of Civil Procedure however to on ny own notion 
4 to consolidate these cases. 
5 MR. MARTINEZ: Absolutely. 
6 THE COURT: I intend to exercise that sone 
7 tine here later today. 
8 MR. MARTINEZ: Uh-hUh. 
9 THE COURT: Let ne just if— let ne see if 
10 I — You have answered all of ny questions. This hasn't 
11 been raised as a counterclaim in the other suits. 
12 MR. MARTINEZ: That's correct, Your Honor. 
13 The question of the integrated econonic unit has not 
14 been raised in the other suits because we were in 
15 essentially a reactive position. As Your Honor is well 
16 aware, these cases nove fairly quickly. And the 
17 landholder has never attempted to stop the development. 
18 That assertion is nade in the pleadings by the state Ue 
19 have no contention in that regard. In fact, the 
20 construction is going on merrily along it's merry way 
21 As we go down SR-36 you see the effects of it 
22 For purposes of the record, Your Honor, I 
23 would also like to emphasize the other points or respond 
24 to the other points that the State nade. But I have 
25 spoken with respect to the consolidation, if Your Honor 
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1 THE COURT: But they'll argue that | 
2 unsuccessfully, at least to a judge, because the judge I 
I 3 has already consolidated those. Uhat that ultinately I 
I 4 neans is that this will become a factual deternination 
Is for a Jury to nake a deternination of how large of a 
6 parcel that is that's impacted, whether this shopping II 
7 center is— was indeed a conceptually larger parcel that I 
I 8 includes these parcels and. therefore, can be deemed a II 
9 part of the impact for purposes of how we assess what I 
I 10 happens 
11 MR MARTINEZ: And I believe, Your Honor, 
I 12 that even when one is instructing the jury, the I 
13 plaintiff is, the plaintiff here in this case, the 
14 landholder, is put at a serious disadvantage when you II 
15 have the State describing the nature of the independent 
16 condennations as opposed to looking at it more globally II 
J 17 in terns of an integrated economic unit. There is no I 
18 harm that comes to the State fron asserting or including I 
I 19 the inverse condemnation clam if in fact the jury can't 
20 consider the entire area. I think we also have to go 
21 back to the standard that is before the Court with 
22 respect to a 12(b)6 notion | 
23 THE COURT: And I understand that standard II 
24 And I appreciate your articulating it because it does I 
25 set it in the prospective associated with this 
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1 is willing to consolidate, and I think we're— I have no 
2 objection to consolidating all four cases into one 
3 Second, the Tightness concern. There is no 
4 Tightness concern. The San Reno Hotel case, that we 
5 have set in the courtesy copies in our pleadings, 
6 demonstrate that— the both San Reno and the Lengel 
7 case, explicitly state the Federal claims can be 
8 adjudicated alongside the State claims. There was sone 
9 degree of confusion about that before those cases cane 
10 out this year. I think it's fairly clear. 
11 THE COURT: I tried to read those cases 
12 because Tightness seemed to be an issue I was concerned 
13 about based upon the pleadings I've seen. But if you 
14 have it, point me to the language that I ought to be 
15 looking at in those cases because I have looked at then 
16 to try to see where it was that provided ne the 
17 extinguishnent of ny concern, let's say, associated with 
IB the issue on Tightness. 
19 MR. MARTINEZ: Yes, Your Honor If you will 
20 look to Case Number 29 m our materials in the courtesy 
21 copies. 
22 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
23 MR. MARTINEZ: And it is Page 17 of the case 
H4 and in the paragraph on the right-hand side, just 
25 immediately following Footnote 25, it says with respect 
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1 to those Federal c l a m s — " 
2 THE COURT: All right. 
3 MR. MARTINEZ: "that did require reckoning, 
4 we reject the petitioner's contention that Uillianson 
5 County forbids the plaintiffs fron advancing their 
6 Federal claims in State courts. The requirenent that 
7 aggrieved property owners can seek conpensation for 
8 their procedures the state has power for doing so does 
9 not preclude State courts fron hearing simultaneously a 
10 plaintiffs request for conpensation under State law and 
11 the clain that in the alternative the denial of 
12 conpensation would violate the defendant under the 
13 Federal Constitution " 
14 THE COURI: Which seens to ne then, we go 
15 back to this issue of renedies, that what the Court is 
16 telling us here is that this is another renedy and 
17 you're not precluded fron pursuing that renedy in the 
18 context of these condemnations. 
19 MR. MARTINEZ: That's exactly right, Your 
20 Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. MARTINEZ: I believe I have addressed the 
23 third point, also, the severance danages question, and 
24 denonstrated why it's a different concept in the inverse 



























What about this San Reno case and Tightness? Really, 
what I'n hearing Uintergreen tell ne is that this is 
really another renedy and that renedy is not precluded 
under an argunent of Tightness. 
MR. HUNTER: Perhaps I'n nlsreadlng San Reno, 
Your Honor. As I — Looking at page 22, naybe I'n placing 
too nuch reliance on Uillianson County, because I've 
been using Uillianson County for so long that I still 
think that that's good law. 
Starting at the top o f — I'n not sure which 
version that you subnitted. Looking at our version, 
which is the official Suprene Court version, on page 22 
at the top. 
THE COURT: And I don't have that. I Just 
brought one in. 
MR. HUNTER: Okay. 
THE COURT: But why don't you tell ne where 
it starts. 
MR. HUNTER: Reading Uillianson County, "To 
preclude plaintiffs fron raising such clains in the 
alternative would erroneously interpret our cases 
requiring property owners to resort to pieceneal 
litigation or otherwise unfair procedures. It Is hardly 
a radical notion to recognize that as a practical natter 
a significant nunber of plaintiffs will necessarily 
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1 condennation setting. 
2 THE COURT: Okay Thank you 
3 MR. MARTINEZ: Thank you, Your Honor 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Colessides, are you going to 
5 have anything to say in this? 
6 MR. COLESSIDES: No, Your Honor 
7 THE COURT: The last tine Mr Coless ides was 
8 here, not the last tine in Tooele, but the last tine he 
9 actually had a case in front of ne, I think I had a 
10 requirenent that you bring baklava to the next 
11 proceeding. 
12 MR COLESSIDES: Your Honor, that will be— 
13 MR. MARTINEZ: I second that 
14 THE COURT: I find that to be no such thing 
15 here today. 
16 MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor changed the 
17 courtroon but we are willing, and not depending upon 
18 your ruling. 
19 THE COURT: Ue want to nake that absolutely 
20 clear. All right. Go ahead, Mr. Hunter. 
21 MR. HUNTER: I can't think of a single 
22 occasion when Mr. Colessides has provided us with 
23 baklava. At any rate— 
24 THE COURT: What about? Let's start with the 
25 Tightness first, because that's the last thing we left. 
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1 litigate their Federal takings in State courts It was 
2 well settled before Uillianson County that a clain that 
3 the application of governnent regulations effect the 
4 taking of property interests is not ripe until the 
5 governnBnt entity charged with inplenenting the 
6 regulation has reached a final decision regarding the 
7 application of the regulations to the property at 
B issue " And that's all I an asking here, is that a 
9 final decision of Just conpensation be reached in those 
10 cases that we're seeking just conpensation. And then if 
11 they think there is sone other just conpensation that 
12 they're entitled to, then an inverse condennation is 
13 appropriate. In the neantme just conpensation will be 
14 awarded then through the condennation cases. 
15 consolidated or not. 
16 THE COURI: I'n sniling because it sounds 
17 like, "Trust ne. I'n fron the governnent We'll take 
IB care of you." 
19 MR. HUNTER: And the governnent will not be 
20 naking that decision. I could care less what the dollar 
21 anount is. 
22 THE COURT: It's the jury that nakes that 
23 decision. 
24 MR. HUNTER; Tfie jury naRes tnat decis ion and 
25 they nake it based upon conpetent evidence and the law 
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1 I retain the right to challenge their evidence as to 
2 whether it's competent or not and P n going to argue 
3 then every inch of the way based on ny interpretation of 
4 the law, because that is defending the Constitution and 
5 that's what I intend to do 
6 To be honest with you, P n very offended at 
7 Mr Martinez's insinuation that the government has 
a developed sone appraisal standards that are 
9 pro-government Those appraisal standards are developed 
10 by the American Appraisal Institute, the very standards 
11 their appraisers use as our appraisers — USPAP -- the 
12 Uniform Standards and Policies for Appraisal Practice 
13 They're not developed by the government And we expect 
14 our appraisers to apply those standards and we will hold 
15 their appraisers to those sane standards That's a very 
16 inappropriate argunent The government is here today to 
17 say Ue want just compensation awarded That was the 
18 prayer of our complaint, it's the prayer of their 
19 counterclaim It's now up to us to determine what that 
20 is Now, Mr Martinez is correct, the landowner is 
21 correct in saying that our appraisals do not include 
22 severance damage 
23 He's alleged that this taking fragments the 
24 land Well, that land was fragmented before, it had a 
25 highway going through it The highway has been widened 
i Page 35 II 
I 1 THE COURT: I understand that, too, but your 
I 2 argument in part is that it should be raised in this II 
3 particular case because otherwise we have fragmented 
J 4 potential verdicts coming back in different pieces and II 
J 5 that is exactly right and it's exactly right associated 
6 with three different parcels s o — 
I 7 MR HUNTER: Three different parcels 
I 8 THE COURT: And it's exactly right associated 
I 9 with three different parcels But the argument on the 
1 10 other side is that these three parcels are part and 
I 11 parcel of the larger parcel 
12 MR HUNTER: Yeah They do enjoy uniformity 
I 13 of ownership and that speaks to a consolidation 
J 14 THE COURT: And so then it becomes again a 
I 15 factual question ultimately that goes to a Jury to make 
I 16 a determination of whether or not they're part and 
I 17 parcel of a larger piece and, therefore, ought to be || 
I 18 considered in larger pieces. But If I don't I 
I 19 consolidate— if I don't consolidate, the very things 
I 20 you argue for here today exist by way of an extension of 
I 21 that argument for purposes of Juries coning to different II 
I 22 results 
I 23 MR HUNTER: That is a risk and it's 
24 sonething that you have got to deal with. And, as I 
25 say, I am not going to lose any sleep should you choose 
Page 34 
1 1 What Piece of his property does this— what larger piece 
2 does this taking touch on? Zero He does not own this 
I 3 property, he does not own this property He does not 
J 4 own this property He does not own this property This 
I 5 is not a Piece of a larger parcel I an sorry It does 
6 not contribute to some grand scheme of a supermarket, of 
7 a shopping center 
8 THE COURT: But that's ultimately up to— 
9 MR HUNTER. That will be argued in the case 
10 THE COURT. And that's a factual question in 
11 determining— the determination of the— 
12 MR HUNTER: Yes The determination of the 
13 larger parcel will be fully litigated in the upcoming 
14 case But this land was already fragmented The 
15 highway went through here — fragmented And we haven't 
16 ignored the reality when our appraisals were done 
17 Those appraisals recognized the reality of that 
18 fragmentation m the appraisals and that's why the 
19 condemnations were filed separately This is not one 
20 parcel We vehemently disagree that this is one parcel 
21 And we hope that Your Honor will allow us 
22 tine to brief the subject of a consolidation notion at 
23 the tine that a consolidation notion is made in those 
24 cases I recognize your power and P n not going to 
25 challenge that 
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1 to consolidate 
2 THE COURT: P n trying to make the State's 
3 burden lighter That is, I'll grant you leave to brief 
4 the particular issue If you really want to, but it seems 
5 to ne you'll have to kind of stay up at nights late 
6 thinking of how you night argue that in sone creative 
7 way to be able to d o — to counteract the very arguments 
8 that you've been making in this case that, you know, 
9 that this should be dismissed 
10 MR. HUNTER: I don't see those as 
11 alternatives, Your Honor, and perhaps— I concede I'm 
12 not the smartest guy In the world P n Just an old 
13 gunfighter that has been sent into the city to try these 
14 cases But these parcels are separate parcels There 
15 is no larger parcel that they are talking about and I 
16 reserve the right to argue that at a jury, to a Jury 
17 The jury will make that determination It's 
18 inappropriate in this case because it will be determined 
19 in those cases And should Your Honor— we will probably 
20 argue it well before then in a consolidation notion and 
21 should Your Honor grant it, we won't lose any sleep over 
22 it Ue just assert that it's inappropriate because 
23 these are independent parcels, they're separated by a 
24 highway, they do not have continuity, physical 
25 continuity, or continuity of developnent potential. And 
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I 1 I believe the facts will show that. But, as I say, 
I 2 that's not the big issue to us The issue today is: Is 
1 3 this appropriate to proceed as an independent inverse 
[ 4 condemnation or even as an inverse condennation in the 
5 condennation cases? I nean we're seeking just 
6 conpensati on 
7 Now, I an uncertain as to whether Mr. 
8 Martinez is arguing that the State statute, 63-30(d)-302 
1 9 is unconstitutional I believe that he needs to say 
I 10 that. Is that unconstitutional? Because Article 1. 
1 11 Section 22, is a self-enforcing clause and it has 
12 renedies. and we recognise those remedies, and the State 
13 has attenpted to define those renedies by referring to 
14 the innlnent donam code And if Mr. Martinez is now 
15 saying that that's inappropriate, I need to understand 
1G that. 
17 Access Let ne address very quickly access. 
18 There is a long history of cases in Utah stating what 
19 your constitutional renedies are for disruption of 
20 access There's no question that highways require sone 
21 sort of access control; otherwise, you just have drivers 
22 pulling on and off everywhere the way it used to be. Ue 
23 have a standard in Utah called an open access highway 
24 and once upon a tine an adjoining property owner had the 
25 right to just pull onto the highway anywhere he wanted 
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1 other points. Mr. Martinez has indicated in his 
| 2 argument that they're not trying to stop the highway. 
I 3 Well, the complaint did have a cause of action for 
4 injunction and they've attenpted to justify that in 
J 5 their pleadings by invoking the Ex Parte Young Doctrine 
I 6 The purpose of the Ex Parte Young Doctrine is to get an 
I 7 injunction. And so, obviously, I an not understanding 
J 8 sonething here. Either they are trying to stop this 
[ 9 action through an injunction or they are giving that UP. 
10 And so they are seeking an additional remedy through 
I 11 this inverse condemnation that it is important for us to 
1 12 defend the State's power. The State has the power to go 
13 forward with those condennatIons, the State has the 
I 14 power to go forward with the construction, they do not 
15 have the right to stop it by way of an injunction, 
16 either under the inverse condemnation or under the Ex 
17 Parte Young Doctrine. Further, the case is not pled as 
IB an Ex Parte Young case. The concept of an Ex Parte 
19 Young is to get around governnental inmunity by suing 
20 the named individuals who operate that governnent agency 
21 and enjoining then from going forward with the agency 
I 22 programs. This has not been alleged. John Nord's name 
23 is not on the pleadings, he has not been served, the 
24 executives of UDOT, the governor have not been naned, 
25 they are not named defendants here. This is not an Ex 
II 
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1 where his property was abutting But that has gone by 
I 2 the wayside in modern times. And now we have some 
3 highways that are access controlled In other words, the 
4 State reserves the right through its police powers to 
5 define where those driveways are in the abutting 
6 property line. And, further, the Supreme Court of the 
7 State of Utah has repeatedly said that a 
8 right-in/right-out is not a denial of access 
9 springvllle Banking cannot state that more clearly and 
10 it has been sustained by the Utah Supreme Court just two 
11 years ago in the case of UDOT versus Harvey, it has been 
12 sustained by the Court of Appeals within the last year. 
13 And access, it means reasonable access They have 
14 reasonable access here. They don't have the right to 
15 define and dictate to the rest of the citizenry what 
16 their access will be That is not part of their bundle 
17 of sticks The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that's 
18 not a part of their bundle of sticks. There is no 
19 taking because that's not a right that they enjoy, plain 
20 and simple under Utah law. Harvey says that, it cannot 
21 be more clear. So they're alleging a loss of a right 
22 that they don't have, when they talk about this loss of 
23 access, and that's why our appraisers didn't give then 
24 noney for it, because they don't have that right. 
25 Let ne just very quickly address a couple of 
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1 Parte Young case. And an injunction, the renedies 
2 sought under Ex Parte Young is inappropriate and we're 
3 attempting to stop that. And that's an important 
4 element in this case, although a very minor element, 
5 certainLy, and we haven't addressed it UP until now, but 
6 that's one of the reasons why we're seeking the 
7 dismissal of this case, is to stop that threat of an 
8 injunction which they have employed. 
9 To summarize, we want to see them receive 
10 just compensation, the full just compensation allowed 
11 them under the Constitution, under the laws of the State 
12 of Utah Ue believe that will happen under the 
13 condennation cases whether they're consolidated or 
14 whether they proceed independently. The facts will play 
15 out as the facts play out and they will receive Just 
16 conpensation. so there is no reason for this inverse 
17 condemnation seeking sone other just compensation. If 
18 they are successful in defining a larger parcel, if they 
19 have competent evidence which conforns with Utah law to 
20 create 1 his larger parcel, they will receive that. Under 
21 the provisions of 78-34-10 in the condemnation cases 
22 They don't need another cause of action, a separate case 
23 to give them another bite of the apple. Thank you, Your 
24 Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Let ne Just ask a question from 
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1 you before you sit down That is the timng for 
2 purposes o f — You want to brief an argunent on the 
3 issue, you want to at least brief the issue of 
4 consolidation? 
5 MR. HUNTER: That 's Mr Cushmg's Job, He's 
6 going to brief that. 
7 MR. CUSHING: I don't like the way you're 
8 looking at ne 
9 MR. HUNTER: He's lead counsel on the 
10 condennations 
11 THE COURT: Do you want to do these— do you 
12 oppose, are you going to oppose, or do you want to nake 
13 an argument associated with consolidation? If you do, 
14 I'll grant you the tine to provide the Court with a 
15 pleading on that. 
16 MR CUSHING: I would like to take the tine 
17 to look at it in nore depth and see what can be 
IB consolidated and what shouldn't be consolidated. So 
19 yes, I would like the tine for that. 
20 MR. MARTINEZ: Your Honor, if I nay seek sone 
21 clarification. When Your Honor refers to consolidation, 
22 there are several different neanings. One i s — 
23 THE COURT: And I understand your— 
24 MR. MARTINEZ: —consolidate of alL four 
25 cases? 
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1 MR. MARTINEZ: I suspect the question would 
2 be whether the State has any objection to folding all 
3 four cases together. 
4 THE COURT: It sounds like they do, but — 
5 MR. HUNTER: Yes, Your Honor, the reason why 
6 is, sinply stated, under an inverse condennation they 
7 have a right to attorney's fees and I think that's 
8 inappropriate. 
9 THE COURT: Right. But at this point your 
10 notion is a notion to disniss under Rule 12(b)S. 
11 MR. HUNTER: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: And the standard associated with 
13 Rule 12(b)6 is fairly liberal. Mr. Martinez has 
14 indicated, at least by way of argunent, that they have 
15 net each of those and we're not at a point where we're 
16 talking about partial sunnary judgnent. Sone of the 
17 argunents being nade today nay be appropriate for 
18 sunnary judgnent, they nay not be, but under a 12(b)6 
19 standard, they nay very well be there and have overcone 
20 the notion to disniss based upon the fact that they have 
21 set out the appropriate pleadings. But, again, P n not 
22 speaking as if I've nade a decision but at least that's 
23 the argunent I've heard today and understand it's 
24 associated with the standard I apply to the case that's 
25 now in front of ne 
Page 42 
1 THE COURT: And I haven't nade that decision 
2 I don't know whether it neans I consolidate three cases 
3 or whether I consolidate four cases 
4 MR. MARTINEZ, Or there's a third alternative 
5 which is to consolidate the three cases and allow the 
6 plaintiff, the landowner, to assert the inverse 
7 condennation in the counterclam within those 
8 consolidated cases 
9 THE COURT: Which is really accomplishing the 
10 sane thing It could be accomplishing the sane thing as 
11 what would happen here if I sinply consolidated it in 
12 MR. MARTINEZ: Yes. I agree. 
13 THE COURT: And, you know, I kind of had sone 
14 mpressions when I cane in associated with the argunents 
15 today and I want to go back and look at the cases that 
16 have been provided to ne before I nake a ruling on that 
17 particular issue, but I think your question, Mr 
18 Martinez, is a good one; that is, I haven't decided yet 
19 exactly what that consolidation night be. And I'n not 
20 certain that ny naking a decision before I hear briefing 
21 on consolidation assists the Court in any particular way 
22 or assists the parties in any particular way, because I 
23 think you have at least those rights one way or the 
24 other. I either consolidate it in or you bring it as a 
25 counterclaim. 
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1 MR. HUNTER: Understood. And perhaps I 
2 haven't addressed that as well as I should have in ny 
3 pleadings. I would certainly like to address these 
4 issues later in a notion for sunnary judgment. 
5 THE COURT: And, well, that's why I cone 
6 back— That's why I cone back to the issue of nootness 
7 because it very well nay be that all of the factual 
8 allegations have been nade but even so, having given 
9 that, under the standard, with all of that being true, 
10 you still haven't net the legal burden because it's noot 
11 and that's why I want to go back and look at the 
12 infornatlon that's been provided here associated with 
13 that. But that's really about the only thing that holds 
14 ne UP fron saying I'n going to deny the notion to 
15 disniss until I look at this— go back to see this 
16 Issue of nootness. Now, if I an convinced that Mr 
17 Martinez's argunent on nootness is the correct one, then 
IB I'll deny the notion. If I'm convinced that it's not 
19 the correct one, and that you nade the argunent that I 
20 need to look at, then I'll, you know, grant the notion 
21 based upon that legal principle, taking all of these 
22 things as true, which I have to do in a 12(b)6, still 
23 don't state a clam because they can't, given the 
24 statute. 
25 MR. HUNTER: And I guess that's where I'n 
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1 standing. I confess I have not addressed 
2 eienent-by-elenent those standards and I've fallen short 
3 there, but the reason why is because they don't have— 
4 they have not stated a cause of action under Utah law. 
5 A U of their rights under Utah law are in those Irminent 
6 donain cases, and they have not stated an independent 
7 cause of action recognized under Utah law. That's ny 
8 notion 
9 THE COURT: I understand 
10 MR. MARTINEZ: Well, Your Honor, saying that 
11 and saying it repeatedly does not change the fact that 
12 the State constitutional clain requires a taking of any 
13 substantial interference with private property which 
14 destroys or materially lessens its value That we have 
15 alleged Or that the owner's right to use and enjoynent 
16 is in any substantially way abridged, destroyed. 
17 Abridged or destroyed. We've alleged that 
IB THE COURT: And I think really that's why I 
19 was asking, the issue associated with renedies, and I 
20 think I cone back to this being a renedy, it's a renedy 
21 that's available to you. We sort it out as we go 
22 forward. 
23 What is the status of discovery in this case 
24 on this grander issue of whether or not there's a great 
25 schene to put the shopping center out there, which is 
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1 that the plaintiff is put into by the fact that the 
2 State brought three different actions, segregating, 
3 fragnenting the area. It's only the inverse 
4 condemnation clain that allows us to expand the scope to 
5 the real econonic reality. 
6 THE COURT: How nuch tine do you need to put 
7 together your thinking as to whether or not you would 
B oppose a consolidation by this Court and, if so, you 
9 would brief it? 
10 MR. CUSHING; In a notion forn? 
11 THE COURT: Let's do this. Can you nake this 
12 decision in a week, whether you wish to brief it? 
13 MR. CUSHING: I can nake that decision within 
14 a week. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. And then If you decide 
16 that you want to brief it, then brief it — 
17 MR. CUSHING: in two weeks to brief that as 
IB wen 
19 THE COURT: Okay. And then after you brief 
20 it, you're certainly entitled to reply. I'll give you 
21 the opportunity to nake that reply. I'n not certain 
22 that I'll hold ny decision here hostage to that 
23 deternination but I probably will. I probably won't 
24 nake ny decision until after I've seen tne briefing on 
25 the consolidation, although I an going to work on this 
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1 going to turn this whole strip into, you know, the 
2 biggest congestion with shopping centers between here 
3 and Wendover? The status of discovery? Has any 
4 discovery been undertaken in this case or is this our 
5 prelim nary— 
6 MR HUNTER: Appraisals have been exchanged 
7 MR COLESSIDES Of course, we're waiting, 
B Your Honor. The discovery will have to take place 
9 assuning that the Court either consolidates and 
10 facilitates as a counterclain and therefore we need to 
11 get additional discovery and additional appraisals, 
12 because the appraisal process is different now, if we 
13 prevail, as I think we should. 
14 MR. HUNTER. Either looking at a larger 
15 parcel versus individual parcels, discovery will be 
16 geared towards that 
17 MR MARTINEZ: And, Your Honor, I think if I 
18 nay nake just two snail points, and that is one of the 
19 things that the separate Constitutional Court is neant 
20 to address. It is a separate and distinct renedy. as 
21 even the State concedes, that they get attorneys fees. 
22 Well, there's a reason for that, because it's a 
23 Constitutional Court And the State— the second point 
24 is that the State continues to hanner on the notion that 
25 it's not one parcel and that is the basic difficulty 
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1 particular issue now. But I don't see it inpacting it 
2 too nuch. 
3 MR. MARTINEZ: And if Your Honor wishes 
4 additional briefing, there are additional points that 
5 were raised and it is a conplicated area and that's why 
G i»n writing a book on it. The State nakes an argunent 
7 with respect to the San Reno Hotel case, it's nuch nore 
8 conplicated than that. 
9 THE COURT: Well. I read both of those cases 
10 and, frankly, you know, I read then to try to get to the 
11 point. I'n going to go back and re-read then with the 
12 idea that they're inportant for the principles which you 
13 espoused today. It sounds like we both have, at least 
14 the parties both have different interpretations of what 
15 San Reno actually neans. But, really, San Reno was— 
16 didn't that involve really a deternination of whether 
17 that action should proceed in Federal court as opposed 
18 to State court? 
19 MR. MARTINEZ: That is correct, Your Honor, 
20 and the plaintiffs nanaged to get thenselves in a 
21 position where they asserted a clam in State court that 
22 was identical to a Federal clain so it went back to the 
23 Federal court, the Court resolved the issue to 
24 conclusion and essentially tne court was forced to 
25 resolve the basic question that I would refer Your Honor 
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1 to, which is: Where can you litigate the Federal clam? 
2 The answer is: You can do it in— 
3 THE COURT: State court. 
4 MR. MARTINEZ: —State court. 
5 THE COURT- Which is really bolstering your 
6 argument that this is an independent renedy. 
7 MR MARTINEZ: Absolutely. And in fact it 
8 overrules a point in that regard by the Utah Suprene 
9 Court which had said that you could not assert the 
10 Federal clain along with your State clam until you had 
11 sought and been denied conpensation The San Reno Hotel 
12 case, at least with respect to the property owners that 
13 I usually advocate for, is a good case and that's 
14 because that at least there is a forun for the Federal 
15 clain that's in State courts. So there nay be a new 
16 chapter in the book. 
17 THE COURT: You very well nay be naKing a new 
IB chapter. Let's have you by letter sinply indicate by 
19 next week at this tine that you have nade a decision, 
20 that decision is you won't oppose consolidation, or you 
21 will oppose consolidation, and you intend to brief it 
22 and you will have your brief out at such and such a 
23 tine. Send that letter directed to ne so I get it, and 
24 to counsel, and then we'll see where that gets us. 
25 Okay? 
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2 I, Peggy Grover. RMR, CCT, do hereby certify 
3 that the foregoing proceedings held on Novenber 29, 
4 2005, at the tine and place indicated, were transcribed 
5 fron a videotape recording of said proceedings provided 
6 by the Clerk of the Court, and that the foregoing pages, 
7 numbered 3 through 50, is a true and accurate 
8 transcription of said videotaped proceedings to the best 
9 of ny ability. 
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1 MR. HUNTER. Thank you, Your Honor 
2 MR. MARTINEZ; Ihank you, Your Honor 
3 THE COURT: Thank you for your argunents 
4 today, they have been helpful 
5 MR MARTINEZ: Thank you, Your Honor 
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IN RESPONSE TO COURT'S REQUEST 
AND IN RESPONSE TO UDOT'S 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF UDOT'S 12(b)(6) 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 050300341 
Judge: Randall N. Skanchy 
Plaintiff Wintergreen Group, LC ("Plaintiff) hereby submits this Supplemental 
Memorandum in response to the court's request at the hearing on Monday, November 29,2005, and 
in response to Defendant UDOT's Supplemental Memorandum in support of its Motion to Dismiss. 
00159 
I. Court May Consolidate all Four Cases or Convert Plaintiffs Fourth Suit into a 
Counterclaim in Consolidated Cases 
Through a letter to the Court dated December 2, 2005, UDOT states that it "will not oppose 
consolidation" of the three "direct" condemnation cases. In addition, UDOT in its Supplemental 
Memorandum states: 
"UDOT asks that the Article I, Section 22 claims either be dismissed as improper assertion 
of a counterclaim under Rule 13 or order that all Article L Section 22 claims for just 
compensation be heard as part of the consolidated condemnation casefsV" (emphasis added) 
Plaintiff properly has properly alleged both state and federal constitutional inverse 
condemnation claims. And since UDOT apparently does not object to having Plaintiffs state 
constitutional inverse condemnation claims consolidated with the three direct condemnation cases, 
this court should either consolidate all four cases or simply convert Plaintiffs fourth suit in its 
entirety into a Counterclaim with respect to each of the three consolidated cases. 
II. Court's Request for Further Briefing Regarding Relation Between Constitutional and 
Statutory Rights for Purpose of Consolidation of all Four Cases 
At the hearing on Monday, November 29, 2005, the Court requested additional briefing 
regarding the relation between Plaintiffs constitutional and statutory rights, and the impact of such 
relationship on the question of consolidation of the three "direct condemnation" cases filed by UDOT 
and the fourth "inverse condemnation" case filed by Plaintiff. 
2 
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A. Relation Between Plaintiffs Constitutional and Statutory Rights 
1. Constitutional Rights 
Plaintiff has the right to "just compensation," under both the Utah and federal constitutions, 
when UDOT "takes" Plaintiffs property, as well as the right to compensation under the Utah 
constitution when UDOT "damages" Plaintiffs property Lmgle v Chevron U S A Inc , 125 S Ct 
2074, 2005 WL 1200710 (U S , May 23, 2005), Smith v Price Development Company, 2005 UT 
87, 2005 WL 3244473 (December 2, 2005), Colman v Utah State Land Bd . 795 P 2d 622, 624 
(Utah 1990) 
The meaning of the constitutional guarantees is not determined by Congress nor by state 
Legislatures, but by the courts Heughs Land L L C v Holladav City, 2005 UT App 202,1J9, 113 
P 3d 1024 (Utah constitutional guarantee is self-executing, statutes to the contrary are 
unconstitutional) 
Plaintiff herein has properly alleged all the elements of state and federal constitutional inverse 
condemnation claims Thus, Plaintiffs complaint properly alleges under the Utah constitution that 
Plaintiffs "property" has been both "taken" and "damaged" through UDOTs conduct Colman v 
Utah State Land Bd . 795 P 2d 622, 626-27(elements of "taking" and "damaging" claims), 
Complaint, Claim 4 ("taking" through substantial interference with private property which destroys 
or materially lessens its value), Claim 5 ("taking" thiough substantial abridgment or destruction of 
right to use and enjoy land), Claim 6 ("damaging" of land). 
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Similarly, Plaintiffs complaint properly alleges under the federal constitution that Plaintiff 
has suffered a "partial taking," a "categorical taking," and because UDOT's conduct does not 
substantially advance a legitimate governmental objective. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 
630-31 (200 l)(discussing partial takings and categorical takings); Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)(discussing "not substantially advance legitimate governmental 
objective" claim); Complaint, Claim 1 (partial taking), Claim 2 (categorical taking), Claim 3 ("not 
substantially advance governmental objective" claim). 
UDOT contends that since it has brought three "direct condemnation" suits, Plaintiffs 
constitutional claims must be dismissed. UDOT thereby argues the supremacy of statutory direct 
condemnation actions—and the remedies the Legislature by grace may have been willing to provide-
over the Constitutional claims and remedies, both state and federal, which Plaintiff properly alleges. 
UDOT has it exactly backwards: it is constitutional rights that prevail over statutory ones. 
The fact that UDOT has initiated statutory direct condemnation actions does not preclude the 
bringing of''inverse condemnation" constitutional claims to seek relief that is not included in those 
direct condemnation actions. Indeed, the purpose of "inverse condemnation" claims is to seek redress 
for harm which the government has caused without intending to do so. The drafters of Utah's Just 
Compensation and Damaging Clause were well aware that unintentionally-caused harm is 
compensable. Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 327 (1898)("Damage is 
not always—in fact is not often contemplated or expected. It comes unlooked for as the consequence 
4 
0015G 
of an act which the party performs. ")(Samuel R. Thurman). And Utah law is clear that "Intent is not 
an element of [an inverse condemnation] action." Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. v. 
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Utah 1990)(interpreting UTAH CONST, art. I, §22). 
Ascertainment of the nature and extent of harm caused through inverse condemnation is a 
question for the jury. The drafters of the Utah Constitution intended that a jury determine whether 
the state has imposed compensable "harm." See Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional 
Convention, 327 (1898)("...the means of arriving at the estimate are within the knowledge of men 
and can be adduced before a jury.")(Lorin Farr). 
Thus, since Plaintiff properly alleges state and federal constitutional claims, UDOT's motion 
to dismiss must be denied. If all four cases are consolidated, the jury, upon proper instructions, can 
be entrusted to determine the appropriate relief. 
2. Statutory Rights 
The power of government to appropriate property using direct condemnation, also known as 
the power of "eminent domain," is held by the federal and state governments as an inherent "attribute 
of sovereignty". Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403,406 (1878); Hawaii 
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 
62, 646 P.2d 835, 837, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (1982). 
Limitations on government direct condemnation power are contained in state and federal 
"taking" and "damaging" provisions, which demand that "just compensation" must be provided. 
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Thus, although the Legislature may provide procedures and remedies for the exercise of the power 
of eminent domain, the Legislature may not provide lesser protection than constitutional "taking" 
and "damaging" provisions demand. 
In this case, UDOT contends that the nature and scope of "compensation" the State is willing 
to provide under Utah statutes implementing the power of eminent domain is identical to-and 
sufficient to satisfy-the constitutional requirements of "just compensation." The shortcoming of 
UDOTs contention inheres in the "larger parcel" concept, which is statutorily mandated in Utah. 
Thus, Utah Code § 78-34-10(2) provides: 
"The court, jury or referee must ... ascertain and assess: if the property sought to be 
condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel the damages which will accrue to the 
portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by [UDOT]..." 
There is no statutory definition of what constitutes the "larger parcel" for any given direct 
condemnation. UDOT has applied that concept to Plaintiff here, however, by treating each of the 
three direct condemnations as concerning separate and distinct lands. Accordingly, UDOT has 
offered NO severance damages whatsoever for any of the three direct condemnations. 
Though UDOT in its December 2, 2005 letter to this Court indicates it does not oppose 
consolidation of the three "direct condemnation" cases, UDOT still expects "to fully litigate factual 
issues such as the larger parcel issue." Therefore, even if the three direct condemnation cases are 
consolidated, UDOT still will insist that the three direct condemnations concern isolated lands, and 
are not part of any "larger parcel" under the statute. The statutory "larger parcel" concept thus limits 
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the available relief under the Legislature's statutory definition of its power of eminent domain 
B. The Statutory "Larger Parcel" Concept is Irrelevant to Plaintiffs Constitutional Rights 
The "larger parcel" concept has no place in state or federal constitutional inverse 
condemnation claims Instead, the jury is merely asked to determine the elements of each claim, 
including identification of the "relevant property" involved Under those claims, Plaintiff is free to 
argue that the "relevant property" consists of the North Town Shopping Center as an integrated 
economic unit 
Moreover, in the inverse condemnation context, Plaintiff also is free to argue that UDOT's 
action consists not only of the bringing of direct condemnation proceedings, but also of UDOT's 
physical actions and omissions which detrimentally affected Plaintiffs entire landholdmgs as the 
"relevant property," as alleged in Plaintiffs complaint Also, Plaintifl is entitled to attorney fees and 
costs under 42 U S C § 1988 
Accordingly, it is essential that Plaintiff should be allowed to bring its constitutional claims, 
as well as its statutory claims, before the jury 
III. Response to UDOTfs Supplemental Memorandum 
Plaintiffs responses will track UDOT's memorandum for the Court's convenience 
1. UDOT reiterates erroneously that the State cannot be sued for federal inverse 
condemnation. 
Plaintiff already has responded to this assertion, both in its Opposition Memorandum and in 
its recent submission of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Smith v Price Development 
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Company, 2005 UT 87, 2005 WL 3244473 (December 2, 2005). 
In contrast, UDOT submits as authority a 1981 decision of a intermediate appellate court in 
Georgia. In that decision. Jackson v. Department of Transp., 159Ga.App. 130,132,283 S.E.2d 59, 
61 (Ga.App.1981), the court pointed out that "Appellants raised no legal objection to the propriety 
of that taking, contesting only the value of the property taken and consequential damages," a 
sentence which UDOT omitted. In contrast, Plaintiff properly has alleged both state and federal 
inverse condemnation claims here. 
2. UDOT erroneously contends injunctive relief is unavailable 
Injunctive relief is available as a remedy for inverse condemnation when the remedy of 
compensation is inadequate. Johnson v. Hermes Associates. Ltd.. 2005 UT 82, % 35 n.8,2005 WL 
3110674. Thus, if this court finds, for example, that a monetary remedy is inadequate, it may order 
UDOT to re-open 2000 North to eastbound traffic in order to make Plaintiff whole. 
3. UDOT misconstrues Lingle 
InLingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.. 125 S. Ct 2074.2005 WL 1200710 (U.S.. May 23:2005V 
the United States Supreme Court held that the "not substantially advance a legitimate governmental 
objective" is not a valid test for adjudicating Just Compensation claims. However, the Court was 
careful to point out that where governmental conduct involves "dedications of property so onerous 
that, outside the exactions context, they would be deemed per se physical takings," compensable 
takings will be deemed to have occurred. Id. at 13. The government may not impose 
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"unconstitutional conditions," the Court held, whereby the government forces a property owner to 
give up one right in exchange for another right which "has little or no relationship to the property." 
Id. 
In this case, UDOT is attempting to force Plaintiff to dedicate to the public the value of 
Plaintiffs lands for construction of the North Town Shopping Center as an integrated economic unit 
in exchange for the compensation Plaintiff might receive in the three condemnation lawsuits which 
artificially fragment Plaintiffs lands into three isolated segments. Such limited compensation has 
"little or no relationship" to the value of Plaintiffs lands for construction of the North Town 
Shopping Center as an integrated economic unit. That is a fundamental reason why Plaintiff brought 
this fourth lawsuit, a critical factor which UDOT would like to have this court overlook. 
In addition, the Lingle court was careful to point out that Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard. 512 U.S. 374 (1994) remained good law. 
Those cases, the Court held, "drew upon the language" of the NSA-LGO test, but did not apply it. 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.. 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2086 (2005) As inNollan and Dolan, UDOT here 
imposed physical constraints on Plaintiffs ability to use its land. These included: UDOT's failure to 
open 2200 North westbound from SR-36; UDOT's rendering of 2200 North as a right-in, right-out 
street in relation to SR-36; and UDOT's blocking of 2000 North from traffic in relation to SR-36. 
Accordingly, UDOT's conduct constituted a taking under those cases, even though the "not 
substantially advance" theory has been abandoned. 
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4. UDOT misapprehends the concept of "ripeness" 
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985) the Court held that two distinct "ripeness" 
requirements applied to federal Just Compensation Clause Claims. First, the claimant must obtain 
a "final" decision from whatever governmental agency or official can inform the claimant about how 
the claimant's property rights will be affected. Thus, the Court held, a subdivision developer not only 
had to submit a development application, but once that was denied, the developer also had to seek-
and be denied—a variance from the local board of adjustment. Significantly, the Court held that no 
appeals had to be "exhausted," but that only administrative mechanisms for obtaining the last word, 
or a "final" decision," had to be utilized. 
Second, the Williamson County court held that a claimant also must satisfy the 
"completeness" requirement, whereby the claimant must ask for-and be denied—compensation 
before a federal Just Compensation Clause claim would be ripe for judicial review. The Court 
reasoned that the federal Just Compensation Clause does not prohibit "takings," but only takings 
without payment of just compensation, and therefore until the claimant was denied compensation, 
the federal Just Compensation Clause claim was not "complete" for purposes of judicial resolution. 
It is the second, "completeness," requirement which UDOT seeks to argue purportedly 
applies here. In San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco. 125 S.Ct. 2491, 2506 
(2005), the court addressed the Catch-22 which the completeness requirement had come to mean for 
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claimants: it required claimants to litigate a takings claim under state law in order to make the 
federal claim "ripe," but if claimants did so, and if the state claim involved adjudication of issues that 
were identical to those under the federal claim, then issue preclusion prohibited the subsequent 
litigation of the same issues under the federal claim in federal court. See Bateman v. City of West 
Bountiful 89 F.3d 704, 709 (10th Cir. 1996)(preventing such relitigation). Accordingly, the claim 
went from "green" to "rotten" without ever being "ripe." See John Martinez & Karen L. Martinez, 
A Prudential Theory for Providing a Forum for Federal Takings Claims, 36 REAL PROPERTY 
PROBATE AND TRUST L.J. 445 (Fall 2001)(discussing "ripeness"). 
In San Remo Hotel the court again barred a claimant who had actually litigated a state claim 
with issues identical to the federal claim from relitigating those issues in federal court. However, the 
court emphasized that, 
"[Petitioners have overstated the reach of Williamson County throughout this litigation.... 
The requirement that aggrieved property owners must seek 'compensation through the 
procedures the State has provided for doing so,'... does not preclude state courts from hearing 
simultaneously a plaintiffs request for compensation under state law and the claim that, in 
the alternative, the denial of compensation would violate the Fifth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution. ... It is hardly a radical notion to recognize that, as a practical matter, a 
significant number of plaintiffs will necessarily litigate their federal takings claims in state 
courts." 
San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco., 125 S.Ct. 2491,2506. 
Similarly, UDOT has overstated the reach of Williamson County. San Remo Hotel makes 
clear that Plaintiff may bring its federal claims to this court. 
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5. UDOT erroneously equates statutory direct condemnation with constitutional claims 
UDOT asserts that "compensation" obtained through the direct condemnation statutory 
procedures is equivalent to "just compensation" under Plaintiffs constitutional inverse condemnation 
claims. Plaintiff has addressed this argument in Part II of this memorandum. 
6. UDOT similarly errs by equating statutory direct condemnation and Plaintiffs state inverse 
condemnation claim 
Plaintiff similarly has addressed this argument in Part II of this memorandum. 
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REQUEST FOR 4-CASE CONSOLIDATION 
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
REQUEST FOR 3-CASE CONSOLIDATION 
PLUS DEEMING 4th CASE COMPLAINT 
AS COUNTERCLAIM 
Case No. 050300341 
Judge: Randall N. Skanchy 
Plaintiff Wintergreen Group, LC ("Plaintiff) hereby submits this Pro Forma Request for 4-
Case Consolidation or, in the Alternative, Request for 3-Case Consolidation Plus Deeming of 4th 
Case Complaint as Counterclaim, in response to the Court's indication at the hearing on Monday, 
'•00 
November 29, 2005 in this matter that the Court would be willing to consider a restructuring of the 
four lawsuits between Plaintiff Wintergreen and Defendant UDOT. 
This Request is styled "pro formaM to indicate Plaintiffs preferences, in light of the Court's 
acknowledged authority under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), and taking into account that 
UDOT apparently consents to consolidation of the state inverse condemnation claims. 
I. Consolidation of AH Four Lawsuits Will Achieve Consistent Jury Determinations 
Under the standard for motions to dismiss, Plaintiff properly states both state and federal 
inverse condemnation claims. UTAH R.CIV.P. 8(a)(Mshort and plain statement... showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief and "a demand for judgment for the relief); Colman v. Utah State Land 
Bd, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990)("A dismissal... should be granted by the trial court only if it is 
clear that a party is not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support 
of its claim. ")(seminal Utah takings case). UDOT's motion to dismiss, therefore, must be denied. 
The question then becomes one of efficient, consistent and fair administration of the four 
lawsuits. A jury must determine both the direct condemnation and inverse condemnation claims. 
Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 327 (1898)("...the means of arriving at 
the estimate are within the knowledge of men and can be adduced before a jury.M)(Lorin Farr). 
Thus, since Plaintiff properly alleges state and federal constitutional claims, all four cases 
should be consolidated so that a single jury will achieve consistent, fair determinations of the four 
lawsuits. UTAH R.Civ.P. 42(a). 
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II. Consolidation of Three Direct Condemnation Lawsuits, Plus Deeming of 4th Case 
Complaint as Counterclaim Also Will Achieve Consistent Jury Determinations 
Alternatively, the Court may achieve the necessary consistency, efficiency and fairness by 
consolidating the three direct condemnation lawsuits, and deeming all claims in the fourth, inverse 
condemnation lawsuit as a Counterclaim, applicable to all three cases in the consolidated action. 
In its December 2, 2005 letter to the Court, UDOT states that it "will not oppose 
consolidation" of the three "direct" condemnation cases. And in its Supplemental Memorandum, 
UDOT states: 
"UDOT asks that the Article I, Section 22 claims either be dismissed as improper assertion 
of a counterclaim under Rule 13 or order that all Article I, Section 22 claims for just 
compensation be heard as part of the consolidated condemnation casefsV" (emphasis added) 
Thus, UDOT apparently has no objection to consolidation of the three cases, plus the 
deeming of the state inverse claims in the fourth lawsuit, as a Counterclaim applicable to all three 
cases in such consolidated action. Plaintiffs federal claims also are properly stated, as demonstrated 
in Plaintiffs previous Memoranda herein. And as a practical matter, similar issues will arise in regard 
to the state and federal claims. Therefore, a jury should be allowed to determine both the state 
inverse condemnation claims, as well as the federal inverse condemnation claims. 
DATED this 8th day of December, 2005. 
/ f / ^ H N M A ' f t T I ^ E Z 
,fS Attorney for Plaintiff 
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